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TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY
Dale W. Jorgenson*
The early 1970s marked the emergence of a rare professional con-
sensus on economic growth, articulated in two strikingly dissimilar
books. Simon Kuznets, the greatest of twentieth century empirical econ-
omists, summarized his decades of research in Economic Growth of Nations
(1971). The enormous impact of this research was recognized in the same
year by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding the third
Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
to Kuznets "for his empirically founded interpretation of economic
growth which has led to new and deepened insight into the economic
and social structure and process of development" (Assar Lindbeck 1992,
p. 79).
Robert Solow’s book Growth Theory (1970), modestly subtitled "An
Exposition," contained his 1969 Radcliffe Lectures at the University of
Warwick. In these lectures Solow also summarized decades of research,
initiated by the theoretical work of Roy Harrod (1939) and Evsey Domar
(1946). Solow’s seminal role in this research, beginning with his brilliant
and pathbreaking essay of 1956, "A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth," was recognized, simply and elegantly, by the Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding Solow the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 1987 "for his contributions to the theory of economic
growth" (Karl-Goran Maler 1992, p. 191).
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After a quarter of a century, the consensus on economic growth of
the early 1970s has collapsed under the weight of a massive accumula-
tion of new empirical evidence, followed by a torrent of novel theoretical
insights. The purpose of this paper is to initiate the search for a new
empirical and theoretical consensus. Any attempt at this thoroughly
daunting task may be premature, since professional interest in growth
currently appears to be waxing rather than waning. Moreover, the dis-
parity of views among economists, always looming remarkably large for
a discipline that aspires to the status of a science, is greater on growth
than most other topics.
The consensus of the early 1970s emerged from a similar period of
fractious contention among competing schools of economic thought, and
this alone is grounds for cautious optimism. However, I believe it is
critically important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the
earlier consensus and how it was dissolved by subsequent theory and
evidence. It is also essential to determine whether elements have survived
that could serve as a useful point of departure in the search for a new one.
Let me first consider the indubitable strengths of the perspective on
growth that emerged victorious over its numerous competitors in the
early 1970s. Solow’s neoclassical theory of economic growth, especially
his analysis of steady states with constant rates of growth, provided con-
ceptual clarity and sophistication. Kuznets generated persuasive empir-
ical support by quantifying the long sweep of historical experience of the
United States and 13 other developed economies. He combined this with
quantitative comparisons among a wide range of developed and devel-
oping economies during the postwar period.
With the benefit of hindsight, the most obvious deficiency of the
neoclassical framework of Kuznets and Solow was the lack of a clear
connection between the theoretical and the empirical components. This
lacuna can be seen most starkly in the total absence of cross-references
between the key works of these two great economists. Yet they were
working on the same topic, within the same framework, at virtually the
same time; and in the very same geographical location--Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Searching for analogies to describe this remarkable coincidence of
views on growth, we can think of two celestial bodies on different orbits,
momentarily coinciding from our earthbound perspective at a single
point in the sky and glowing with dazzling but transitory luminosity. The
indelible image of this extraordinary event has been burned into the
collective memory of economists, even if the details have long been
forgotten. The common perspective that emerged remains the guiding
star for subsequent conceptual development and empirical observation.
In the next section I consider challenges to the traditional framework
of Kuznets and Solow arising from new techniques for measuring
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and the corresponding econometric techniques led to the successful
implementation of constant-quality measures of capital and labor inputs
and investment goods output. However, it was not until July 11, 1994,
that these measures were incorporated into a new official productivity
index for the United States by the Bureau of Labor Statistics!
The recent revival of interest in economic growth by the larger
community of economists can be dated from Angus Maddison’s (1982)
updating of Kuznets’ (1971) long-term comparisons of economic growth
among industrialized countries. This was followed by the successful
exploitation of the Penn World Table--created by Irving Kravis, Alan
Heston, and Robert Summers (1978)--which provided comparisons
among more than 100 developed and developing countries. Exploiting
the panel data structure of these comparisons, Nasrul Islam (1995) was
able to show that the Solow model is the appropriate point of departure
for modeling the endogenous accumulation of tangible assets.
The new developments in economic measurement and modeling
summarized in the following section have cleared the way for undertak-
ing the difficult, if unglamorous, task of constructing quantitative models
of growth suitable for the analysis of economic policies. Models based
on the neoclassical framework of Kuznets and Solow determine growth
by exogenous forces, principally spillovers from technological innova-
tions. By contrast, models based on the new framework, described next,
determine the great preponderance of economic growth endogenously,
through investments in tangible assets and human capital.
Endogenous models of economic growth require concepts of an
aggregate production function and a representative consumer that can be
implemented econometrically. These concepts imply measurements of
welfare and productivity that can best be organized by means of a system
of national accounts. The accounts must include production, income and
expenditure, capital formation, and wealth accounts, as in the United
Nations (1993) System oj:National Accounts. Alternative economic policies
can then be ranked by means of equivalent variations in wealth, provid-
ing the basis for policy recommendations.
I then ’describe quantitative models suitable for the analysis of
economic policies. Econometric techniques have provided the missing
link between the theoretical and empirical components of the consensus
of the early 1970s. The development of these techniques was a major
achievement of the 1970s and successful applications began to emerge
only in the 1980s. These techniques were unavailable when Solow (1970)
first articulated the objective of constructing econometric models of
growth for the analysis of economic policies.
The growth of tangible assets is endogenous within a Solow (1956,
1970) neoclassical growth model. Kun-Young Yun and I constructed a
complete econometric model for postwar U.S. economic growth with this
feature in two papers published in 1986. We have used this model to48 Dale W. Jorgenson
analyze the economic impact of fundamental tax reforms. Subsequently,
Mun Ho and I extended this model to incorporate endogenous growth in
human capital; we have employed the extended model to analyze the
impact of alternative educational policies (1995).
Although endogenous investment in new technology has been a
major theme in growth theory for four decades, empirical implementa-
tion has foundered on the issue, first identified by Zvi Griliches (1973), of
measuring the output of research and development activities. Until this
issue has been successfully resolved, a completely endogenous theory
of economic growth will remain a chimera, forever tantalizing to the
imagination, but far removed from the practical realm of economic
policy. The final section assesses the prospects for endogenizing invest-
ment in new technology and offers conclusions.
SOURCES AND USES OF GROWTH
The objective of modeling economic growth is to explain the sources
and uses of economic growth endogenously. National income is the
starting point for assessments of the uses of economic growth through
consumption and saving. The concept of a Measure of Economic Welfare,
introduced by William Nordhaus and James Tobin (1972), is the key to
augmenting national income to broaden the concepts of consumption and
saving. Similarly, gross national product is the starting point for attrib-
uting the sources of economic growth to investments in tangible assets
and human capital, but it could encompass investments in new technol-
ogy as well.
The allocation of the sources of economic growth between investment
and productivity is critical for assessing the explanatory power of growth
theory. Only substitution between capital and labor inputs resulting from
investment in tangible assets is endogenous in Solow’s neoclassical model
of economic growth. However, substitution among different types of
labor inputs is the consequence of investment in human capital, while
investment in tangible assets also produces substitution among different
types of capital inputs. These were not included in Solow’s (1957) model
of production.
Productivity growth is labor-augmenting or equivalent to an increase
in population in the simplest version of the neoclassical growth model. If
productivity growth greatly predominates among the sources of eco-
nomic growth, as indicated by Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1957), most of
growth is exogenously determined. Reliance on the Solow residual as
an explanatory factor is a powerful indictment of the limitations of the
neoclassical framework. This viewpoint was expressed by Moses
Abramovitz (1956), who famously characterized productivity growth as a
"measure of our ignorance."
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Ramsey model of optimal growth introduced by David Cass (1965) and
Tjalling Koopmans (1965). A promising start on the empirical implemen-
tation of this model was made in my 1967 paper with Griliches. It
appeared that 85 percent of U.S. economic growth could be made
endogenous; determinants of the remaining 15 percent were left for
further investigation, but might be attributable to investments in new
technology.1
The conclusions of my paper with Griliches were corroborated in
two studies I published in 1969 and 1970 with Laurits Christensen. These
studies provided a much more detailed implementation of the concept of
capital as a factor of production. We utilized a model of the tax structure
for corporate capital income that I had developed in a series of papers
with Robert Hall (1967, 1969, 1971). Christensen and I extended this
model to noncorporate and household capital incomes in order to capture
the impact of additional differences in returns to capital due to taxation
on substitutions among capital inputs.
In 1973, Christensen and I incorporated estimates of the sources of
economic growth into a complete system of U.S. national accounts in our
paper, "Measuring Economic Performance in the Private Sector."2 Our
main objective was the construction of internally consistent income,
product, and wealth accounts. Separate product and income accounts
were integral parts of both the U.S. Income and Product Accounts3 and
the United Nations (1968) System of National Accounts designed by
Richard Stone.4 However, neither system included wealth accounts
consistent with the income and product accounts.
Christensen and I constructed income, product, and wealth accounts,
paralleling the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, for the
period 1929 to 1969. We implemented our vintage accounting system for
the United States on an annual basis. The complete system of vintage
accounts gave stocks of assets of each vintage and their prices. The stocks
were cumulated to obtain asset quantities, providing the perpetual
inventory of assets accumulated at different points of time or different
vintages employed by Raymond Goldsmith (1955-56; 1962).
The key innovation in our vintage system of accounts was the use of
asset pricing equations to link the prices used in evaluating capital stocks
1 See Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), Table IX, p. 272. We also attributed 13 percent of
growth to the relative utilization of capital, measured by energy consumption as a
proportion of capacity; however, this is inappropriate at the aggregate level, as Edward
Denison (1974, p. 56), pointed out. For additional details, see Jorgenson, Frank Gollop, and
Barbara Fraumeni (1987), especially pp. 179-81.
~ This paper was presented at the thirty-seventh meeting of the Conference on Research
in Income and Wealth, held at Princeton, New Jersey in 1971.
3 See, for example, U.S. Office of Business Economics (1966).
4 The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) is summarized by Stone
(1984) in his Nobel Prize address. The SNA has been revised in United Nations (1993).50 Dale W. Jorgenson
and the rental prices employed in our constant-quality index of capital
input. In a prescient paper on the measurement of welfare, Paul Samuel-
son (1961) had suggested that the link between asset and rental prices
was essential for the integration of income and wealth accounting
proposed by Irving Fisher (1906).5 Our system of accounts employed
the specific form of this relationship developed in my 1967 paper, "The
Theory of Investment Behavior."
Christensen and I distinguished two approaches to the analysis of
economic growth. We identified the production account with a produc-
tion possibility frontier describing technology. The underlying concep-
tual framework was an extension of the aggregate production function
--introduced by Paul Douglas (1948) and developed by Jan Tinbergen
(1942) and Solow (1957)--to include two outputs, investment and con-
sumption goods. These two outputs were distinguished in order to
incorporate constant-quality indices of investment goods.
We utilized constant-quality indices of capital and labor inputs in
allocating the sources of economic growth between investment and
productivity. Our constant-quality index of labor input combined differ-
ent types of hours worked into a constant-quality index of labor input,
using methodology Griliches (1960) had developed for U.S. agriculture.
This considerably broadened the concept of substitution employed by
Solow (1957) and altered, irrevocably, the allocation of economic growth
between investment and productivity.6
Our constant-quality index of capital combined different types of
capital inputs. We identified input prices with rental rates, rather than the
asset prices appropriate for the measurement of capital stock. For this
purpose we used a model of capital as a factor of production I had
introduced in my 1963 article, "Capital Theory and Investment Behav-
ior." This made it possible to incorporate differences in returns due to the
tax treatment of different types of capital income.7
Our constant-quality measure of investment goods generalized
Solow’s (1960) concept of embodied technical change. My 1966 paper,
"The Embodiment Hypothesis," showed that economic growth could be
interpreted, equivalently, as "embodied" in investment or "disembod-
ied" in productivity growth. My 1967 paper with Griliches removed this
indeferminacy by introducing constant-quality indices for investment
s See Samuelson (1961), especially p. 309.
6 Constant-quality indices of labor input are discussed in detail by Jorgenson, Gollop,
and Fraumeni (1987), Chapters 3 and 8, pp. 69-108 and 261-300, and Jorgenson, Ho, and
Fraumeni (1994).
7 A detailed survey of empirical research on the measurement of capital input is given
in my 1996 paper, "Empirical Studies of Depreciation," and Jack Triplett’s (1996) paper,
"Measuring the Capital Stock: A Review of Concepts and Data Needs," both presented at
a meeting of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, held at Washington, D.C.,
in May 1992.TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 51
goods.8 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 1986) has now in-
corporated a constant-quality price index for investment in computers
into the U.S. national accounts.9
Constant-quality price indices for investment goods of different ages
or vintages were developed by Hall (1971). This important innovation
made it possible for Charles Hulten and Frank Wykoff (1982) to estimate
relative efficiencies by age for all types of tangible assets included in the
national accounts, putting the measurement of capital consumption onto
a solid empirical foundation. Estimates of capital inputs presented in my
1987 book with Gollop and Fraumeni were based on the Hulten-Wykoff
relative efficiencies. The BEA (1995) has incorporated these relative
efficiencies into measures of capital consumption in the latest benchmark
revision of the UoS. National Income and Product Accounts.1°
Christensen and I identified the income and expenditure account
with a social welfare function. The conceptual framework was provided
by the representation of intertemporal preferences employed by Frank
Ramsey (1928), Samuelson (1961), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), and
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972). Following Kuznets (1961), we divided the
uses of economic growth between current consumption and future con-
sumption through saving. Saving was linked to the asset side of the
wealth account through capital accumulation equations for each type of
asset. Prices for different vintages were linked to rental prices of capital
inputs through a parallel set of capital assetopricing equations.
The separation of production and welfare approaches to economic
growth had important implications for the theory. The Ramsey model, so
beautifully expounded by Solow (1970), had two separate submodels
--one based on producer behavior and the other on consumer behavior.
The production account could be linked to the submodel of production
and the income and expenditure account to the submodel of consump-
tion. This made it possible, at least in principle, to proceed from the
design stage of the theory of economic growth, emphasized by Solow, to
8 A detailed history of constant-quality price indices is given by Ernst Berndt (1991).
Triplett’s (1990) contribution to the Jubilee of the Conference on Research in Income and
Wealth discusses obstacles to the introduction of these indices into government statistical
programs. Robert Gordon (1990) constructed constant-quality indices for all types of
producers’ durable equipment in the national accounts and Paul Pieper (1989, 1990) gave
constant-quality indices for all types of structures.
9 Rosam~e Cole, Y.C. Chen, Joan Barquin-Stolleman, Ellen Dulberger, Nurhan Helva-
cian, and James Hodge (1986) reported the results of a joint project conducted by BEA and
IBM to construct a constant-quality index for computers. Triplett (1986) discussed the
economic interpretation of constant-quality price indices iaa an accompanying article. Ellen
Dulberger (1989) presented a more detailed report, while Triplett (1989) gave an extensive
survey of empirical research on constant-quality price indices for computers. Allan Young
(1989) answered Denison’s (1989) objections and reiterated BEA’s rationale for introducing
a constant-quality price index for computers.
10 The methodology is described by Fraumeni (1996).52 Dale W. Jorgenson
econometric modeling, which he accurately described as "much more
difficult and less glamorous."11
In summary, the dizzying progress of empirical work on economic
growth by 1973 had created an impressive agenda for future research.
Christensen and I had established the conceptual foundations for quan-
titative models of growth suitable for analyzing the impact of policies
affecting investment in tangible assets. However, critical tasks, such as
construction of constant-quality indices of capital and labor inputs and
investment goods output, remained to be accomplished. The final step in
this lengthy process was completed only with the benchmark revision of
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts in September 1995!
THE GROWTH REVIVAL
On October 16, 1973, the beginning of the Arab Oil Embargo ushered
in a series of sharp increases in world petroleum prices that led to a
rapidly deepening recession in industrialized countries, accompanied by
a rise in inflation. Since this contradicted one of the fundamental tenets of
the reigning Keynesian orthodoxy in macroeconomics, it engendered a
shift in the focus of macroeconomic research from economic growth to
stagflation. Debates among Keynesians, Old and New, monetarists, and
New Classical macroeconomists took center stage, pushing disputes
among the proponents of alternative views on economic growth into the
background.
In graduate courses in macroeconomics the theory of economic
growth was gradually displaced by newer topics, such as rational
expectations and policy ineffectiveness. Elementary skills required for
growth analysis--national income and product accounting, index num-
ber theory, the perpetual inventory method, and intertemporal asset
pricing--were no longer essential for beginning researchers and fell into
disuse. Even the main points of contention in the rancorous debates over
growth in the early 1970s began to fade from the collective memory of
economists.
Like a watercourse that encounters a mountain range, the stream of
research on endogenous growth continued to flow unabated and unob-
served, gathering momentum for its later reemergence into the light of
professional debate. When it did erupt in the early 1980s, the initial
impulse threatened to wash away the entire agenda that had been
laboriously put into place following the canonical formulation of the
neoclassical framework in the early 1970s. The renewed thrust toward
endogenizing economic growth acquired startling but illusory force by
~1 See Solow (1970), p. 105. He went on to remark, "But it may be what God made
graduate students for. Presumably he had something in mind."TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 53
channeling most of its energy into a polemical attack on the deficiencies
of the "exogenous" theories of growth of Kuznets and Solow.
The flow of new talent into research on economic growth was
interrupted for a decade, sapping the high level of intellectual energy
that fueled the rapid progress of the early 1970s. The arrival of a new
generation of growth economists in the early 1980s signaled a feverish
period of discovery and rediscovery that is still under way. This has been
followed by a revival of the latent interests of many economists in
economic growth after a substantial time lapse. The consequence of this
time lapse has been a form of amnesia, familiar to readers who recall
Washington Irving’s fictional character Rip Van Winkle. To remedy this
collective lapse of memory it is essential to bring our story of the
dissolution of the neoclassical framework up to date.
We can fix the revival of interest in economic growth by the larger
community of economists with some precision at Maddison’s (1982)
updating and extension of Kuznets’ (1971) long-term estimates of the
growth of national product for 14 industrialized countries, including the
United States. Maddison added Austria and Finland to Kuznets’ list and
presented growth rates covering periods beginning as early as 1820 and
extending through 1979. Maddison (1991, 1995) has extended these
estimates through 1992. Attempts to analyze Maddison’s data led to the
"convergence debate" initiated by Abramovitz (1986) and William Bau-
tool (1986).
Denison (1967) had compared differences in growth rates for national
income per capita for the period 1950 to 1962 with differences of levels in
1960 for eight European countries and the United States. He also
compared sources of these differences in both growth rates and levels.
The eight European countries as a whole were characterized by much
more rapid growth and a lower level of national income per capita.
However, this association was not monotonic for comparisons between
individual countries and the United States. Nonetheless, Denison con-
cluded: "Aside from short-term aberrations Europe should be able to
report higher growth rates, at least in national income per person
employed, for a long time. Americans should expect this and not be
disturbed by it."12
Kuznets (1971) provided elaborate comparisons of growth rates for
the 14 countries included in his study. Unlike Denison (1967), he did not
provide comparisons of levels. Maddison (1982) filled this gap by
comparing levels of national product for 16 countries. These comparisons
were based on estimates of purchasing power parities by Kravis, Heston,
12 See Denison (1967), especially Chapter 21, "The Sources of Growth and the Contrast
between Europe and the United States," pp. 296-348.54 Dale W. Jorgenson
and Summers (1978).13 These estimates have been updated by successive
versions of the Penn World Table.14 These data have made it possible
to reconsider the issue of convergence of productivity levels raised by
Denison (1967).
Abramovitz (1986) was the first to take up the challenge of analyzing
convergence of productivity levels among Maddison’s 16 countries. He
found that convergence appeared to characterize the postwar period,
while the period before 1914 and the interwar period revealed no
tendencies of productivity levels to converge. Baumol (1986) formalized
these results by running a regression of growth rate of GDP per hour
worked over the period 1870 to 1979 on the 1870 level of GDP per hour
worked.15
In a notable paper on "Crazy Explanations for the Productivity
Slowdown," Paul Romer (1987) derived a version of the growth regres-
sion from Solow’s (1970) growth model with a Cobb-Douglas production
function. An important empirical contribution of the paper was to extend
the data set for growth regressions from Maddison’s (1982) group of 16
advanced countries to the 115 countries included in the Penn World Table
(Mark 3), presented by Robert Summers and Alan Heston (1984). Romer’s
key finding was that an indirect estimate of the Cobb-Douglas elasticity
of output with respect to capital was close to three-quarters. The share
of capital in GNP implied by Solow’s model was less than half as great,
on average.16
Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil (1992) provided a
defense of the neoclassical framework of Kuznets (1971) and Solow
(1970). The empirical portion of their study is based on data for 98
countries from the Penn World Table (Mark 4), presented by Summers
and Heston (1988). Like Paul Romer (1987), Mankiw, David Romer, and
Weil derived a growth equation from the Solow (1970) model; however,
they also augmented this model by allowing for investment in human
capital.
The results of Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil (1992) produced
13.For details see Maddison (1982, pp. 159-168). Purchasing power parities were first
measured for industrialized countries by Milton Gilbert and Kravis (1954) and Gilbert et al.
(1958).
14 A complete list through Mark 5 is given by Summers and Heston (1991), while the
results of Mark 6 are summarized by the World Bank in the World Development Report 1993.
15 This "growth regression" has spawned a vast literature, summarized by Ross Levine
and David Renelt (1992), Baumol (1994), and Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-I-Martin (1994).
Much of this literature has been based on successive versions of the Penn World Table.
16 Unfortunately, this Mark 3 data set did not include capital input. Romer’s empirical
finding has spawned a substantial theoretical literature, summarized at an early stage by
Robert Lucas (1988) and, more recently, by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991,
1994), Romer (1994), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1994). Romer’s own important contribu-
tions to this literature have focused on increasing returns to scale, as in Romer (1986), and
spillovers from technological change, as in Romer (1990).TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 55
empirical support for the augmented Solow model. There was clear
evidence of the convergence predicted by the model; in addition, the
estimated Cobb-Douglas elasticity of output with respect to capital was
in line with the share of capital in the value of output. The rate of
convergence of productivity was too slow to be consistent with the 1970
version of the Solow model, but it is consistent with the augmented
version.
Finally, Islam (1995) exploited an important feature of the Summers-
Heston (1988) data set overlooked in prior empirical studies. This panel
data set contains benchmark comparisons of levels of the national
product at five-year intervals, beginning in 1960 and ending in 1985. This
made it possible for Islam to test an assumption maintained in growth
regressions, such as those of Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil. Their
study, like that of Paul Romer (1987), was based on cross sections of
growth rates. Both studies assumed identical technologies for all coun-
tries included in the Summer-Heston data sets.
Substantial differences in overall levels of productivity among coun-
tries have been documented by Denison (1967), my paper with Chris-
tensen and Dianne Cummings (1981), and, more recently, my paper with
Chrys Dougherty (1996). By introducing econometric methods for panel
data, Islam (1995) was able to allow for these differences in technology.
He corroborated the finding of Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil (1992)
that the elasticity of output with respect to capital input coincided with
the share of capital in the value of output. This further undermined the
empirical support for the existence of the increasing returns and spill-
overs analyzed in the theoretical models of Paul Romer (1986, 1990).
In addition, Islam (1995) found that the rate of convergence of
productivity among countries in the Summers-Heston (1988) data set was
precisely that required to substantiate the unaugmented version of the
Solow model (1970). In short, "crazy explanations" for the productivity
slowdown, like those propounded by Paul Romer (1987, 1994), are not
required to explain the complexities of panels of data for advanced and
developing countries. Moreover, the model did not require augmenta-
tion, as suggested by Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil (1992). However,
differences in technology among these countries must be taken into
account in econometric modeling of differences in growth rates.
The conclusfon from Islam’s (1995) research is that the Solow model
is an appropriate point of departure for modeling the endogenous
accumulation of tangible assets. For this purpose it is not essential to
endogenize human capital accumulation as well. The rationale for this
key empirical finding is that the transition path to balanced growth
equilibrium requires decades after a change in policies, such as tax
policies, that affect investment in tangible assets. By comparison, the
transition after a change in policies affecting investment in human capital
requires as much as a century.56 Dale W. Jorgenson
Islam’s conclusions are strongly reinforced in two important papers
by Charles Jones (1995a, 1995b), testing alternative models of economic
growth based on endogenous investment in new technology. Jones
(1995a) tests models proposed by Paul Romer (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), and Phillippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1992). This
model is based on an endogenous growth rate, proportional to the level
of resources devoted to research and development. Jones (1995a) dem-
onstrates that this implication of the model is contradicted by evidence
from the advanced countries that conduct the great bulk of research and
development. While these countries have steadily increased the resources
devoted to research and development, growth rates have been stable or
declining.
Jones (1995b) tests models of endogenous investment in new tech-
nology proposed by Romer (1986, 1987), Lucas (1988), and Sergio Rebelo
(1991), so-called AK models. These models have a growth rate that is
proportional to the investment rate; Jones (1995b) shows that there are
persistent changes in investment rates for advanced countries, while
there are no persistent changes in growth rates. Jones (1995b, p. 519)
concludes that "Both AK-style models and the R&D-based models are
clearly rejected by this evidence." Jones (1995a) suggests, as an alternative
approach, models that make investment in new technology endogenous,
by preserving the feature of the Solow model that long-run growth rates
are determined by exogenous forces. We consider the obstacles that
remain to successful implementation of this approach below.
In summary, the convergence debate provided an excellent medium
for the revival of interest in growth. The starting point for this debate was
the revival of Kuznets’ program for research on long-term trends in the
growth of industrialized countries by Maddison (1982, 1991, 1995). As the
debate unfolded, the arrival of successive versions of the Penn World
Table engaged the interests of new entrants into the field in cross-section
variations in patterns of growth. However, a totally novel element ap-
peared in the form of relatively sophisticated econometric techniques. In
the work of Islam (1995) these were carefully designed to bring out the
substantive importance of cross-section differences in technology. This
prov.ed to be decisive in resolving the debate.
ENDOGENOUS GROWTH
Despite substantial progress in endogenizing economic growth over
the past two decades, profound differences in policy implications militate
against any simple resolution of the debate on the relative importance
of investment and productivity. Proponents of income redistribution
will not easily abandon the search for a "silver bullet" that will generate
economic growth without the necessity 6f providing incentives for
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strategies based on capital formation will not readily give credence to
claims of the importance of external benefits that "spill over" to benefi-
ciaries that are difficult or impossible to identify.
The proposition that investment is a more important source of
economic growth than productivity is just as controversial today as it
was in 1973. The distinction between substitution and technical change
emphasized by Solow (1957) parallels the distinction between investment
and productivity as sources of economic growth. However, Solow’s
definition of investment, like that of Kuznets (1971), was limited to
tangible assets. Both specifically excluded investments in human capital
by relying on undifferentiated hours of work as a measure of labor input.
Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1957) identified the contribution of
tangible assets with increases in the stock, which does not adequately
capture substitution among different types of capital inputs. Constant-
quality indices of both capital and labor inputs and investment goods
output are essential for successful implementation of the production
approach to economic growth. By failing to adopt these measurement
conventions, Kuznets and Solow attributed almost all of U.S. economic
growth to the Solow residual.17
To avoid the semantic confusion that pervades popular discussions
of economic growth, it is essential to be precise in distinguishing between
investment and productivity. Investment is the commitment of current
resources in the expectation of future returns and can take a multiplicity
of forms. This is the definition introduced by Fisher (1906) and discussed
by Samuelson (1961). The distinctive feature of investment as a source of
economic growth is that the returns can be internalized by the investor.
The most straightforward application of this definition is to investments
that create property rights, including rights to transfer the resulting assets
and benefit from incomes that accrue to the owners.18
Investment in tangible assets provides the most transparent illustra-
tion of investment as a source of economic growth. This form of
investment creates transferable property rights with returns that can be
internalized. However, investment in intangible assets through research
and development also creates intellectual property rights that can be
transferred through outright sale or royalty arrangements and returns
that can be internalized. Private returns to this form of investment--
17 The measurement conventions of Kuznets and Solow remain in common use. See, for
example, the references given in my 1990 article, "Productivity and Economic Growth,"
presented at The Jubilee of the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, held in
Washington, D.C., in 1988. For recent examples, see Martin Baily and Gordon (1988), Steven
Englander and Axel Mittelstadt (1988), Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer (1989), pp.
2-5, Baily and Charles Schultze (1990), Gordon (1990), Englander and Andrew Gurney
(1994), and Lawrence Lau (1996).
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returns that have been internalized--have been studied intensively in the
literature surveyed by Griliches (1994, 1995) and Bronwyn Hall (1996).
The seminal contributions of Gary Becker (1993), Fritz Machlup
(1962), Jacob Mincer (1974), and Theodore Schultz (1961) have given
concrete meaning to the concept of "wealth in its more general sense"
employed by Fisher (1906). This notion of wealth includes investments
that do not create property rights. For example, a student enrolled in
school or a worker participating in a training program can be viewed as
an investor. Although these investments do not create assets that can be
bought or sold, the returns to higher educational qualifications or better
skills in the workplace can be internalized. The contribution of invest-
ments in education and training to economic growth can be identified in
the same way as for tangible assets.
The mechanism by which tangible investments are translated into
economic growth is well understood. For example, an investor in a new
industrial facility adds to the supply of assets and generates a stream of
rental income. The investment and the income are linked through
markets for capital assets and capital services. The income stream can be
divided between the increase in capital input and the marginal product
of capital or rental price. The increase in capital contributes to output
growth in proportion to the marginal product. This is the basis for
construction of a constant-quality index of capital input.
Griliches (1973, 1979, 1995) has shown how investments in new
technology can be translated into economic growth. An investor in a new
product design or process of production adds to the supply of intellectual
assets and generates a stream of profits or royalties. The increase in
intellectual capital contributes to output growth in proportion to its
marginal product in the same way as the acquisition of a tangible asset.
However, investments in research and development, unlike those in
tangible assets, are frequently internal to the firm, so that separation of
the private return between the input of intellectual capital and the
marginal product or rental price of this capital is highly problematical.
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994) and Griliches have provided
estimates of the contribution of these investments to economic growth.
Finally, an individual who completes a course of education or
training adds to the supply of people with higher qualifications or skills.
The resulting income stream can be decomposed into a rise in labor input
and the marginal product of labor or wage rate. The increase in labor
contributes to output growth in proportion to the marginal product. This
provides the basis for constructing a constant-quality index of labor
input. Although no asset markets exist for human capital, investments in
human and nonhuman capital have the common feature, pointed out by
Fisher (1906), that returns are internalized by the investor.
The defining characteristic of productivity as a source of economic
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to the economic activities that generate growth. ~These benefits "spill
over" to income recipients not involved in these activities, severing the
connection between the creation of growth and the incomes that result.
Since the benefits of policies to create externalities cannot be appro-
priated, these policies typically involve government programs or activi-
ties supported through public subsidies. Griliches (1992, 1995) has pro-
vided detailed surveys of "spillovers" from investment in research and
development.19
Publicly supported research and development programs are a lead-
ing illustration of policies to stimulate productivity growth. These
programs can be conducted by government laboratories or financed by
public subsidies to private laboratories. The justification for public
financing is most persuasive for aspects of technology that cannot be fully
appropriated, such as basic science and generic technology. The benefits
of the resulting innovations are external to the economic units conducting
the research and development, and these must be carefully distinguished
from the private benefits of research and development that can be
internalized through the creation of intellectual property rights.
An important obstacle to resolution of the debate over the relative
importance of investment and productivity is that it coincides with
ongoing disputes about the appropriate role for the public sector.
Productivity can be identified with spillovers of benefits that do not
provide incentives for actors within the private sector. Advocates of a
larger role for the public sector advance the view that these spillovers can
be guided into appropriate channels only by an all-wise and beneficent
government sector. By contrast, proponents of a smaller government
search for means to privatize decisions about investments by decentral-
izing investment decisions among participants in the private sector of the
economy.
Kevin Stiroh and I (1995) have shown that investments in tangible
assets are the most important sources of postwar U.S. economic growth.
These investments appear on the balance sheets of firms, industries, and
the nation as a whole as buildings, equipment, and inventories. The
benefits appear on the income statements of these same economic units as
profits, rents, and royalties. The BLS (1983) compiled an official constant-
quality index of capital input for its initial estimates of total factor
productivity, renamed as multifactor productivity.
The BLS retained hours worked as a measure of labor input until
July 11, 1994, when it released a new multifactor productivity measure
incorporating a constant-quality index of labor input as well as the BEA’s
(1986) constant-quality index for investment in computers. The final step
19 Griliches (1992) also gives a list of survey papers on spillovers. Griliches (1979, 1995)
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in empirically implementing a constant-quality index of the services of
tangible assets was the incorporation of Hulten-Wykoff (1982) relative
efficiencies into the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts by the
BEA (1995). Four decades of empirical research, initiated by Goldsmith’s
(1955-56) monumental treatise, A Study of Saving, have provided a sound
empirical foundation for endogenizing investment in tangible assets.
Stiroh and I have shown that the growth of labor input is second
in importance only to capital input as a source of economic growth.
Increases in labor incomes have made it possible to measure investments
in human capital and assess their contributions to economic growth. In
1989 Fraumeni and I extended the vintage accounting system developed
in my 1973 paper with Christensen to incorporate these investments. Our
essential idea was to treat individual members of the U.S. population as
human assets with "asset prices" given by their lifetime labor incomes.
Constant-quality indices of labor input are an essential first step in
incorporating investments in human capital into empirical studies of
economic growth. We implemented our vintage accounting system for
both human and nonhuman capital for the United States on an annual
basis for the period 1948 to 1984.
Asset prices for tangible assets can be observed directly from market
transactions in investment goods; intertemporal capital asset pricing
equations are used to derive rental prices for capital services. For human
capital, wage rates correspond to rental prices and can be observed
directly from transactions in the labor market. Lifetime labor incomes are
derived by applying asset pricing equations to these wage rates. These
incomes are analogous to the asset prices used in accounting for tangible
assets in the system of vintage accounts I had developed with Christensen
(1973).
Fraumeni and I have developed a measure of the output of the U.S.
education sector, presented in Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992b). Our
point of departure was that while education is a service industry, its
output is investment in human capital. We estimated investment in
education from the impact of increases in educational attainment on the
lifetime incomes of all individuals enrolled in school. We found that
investment in education, measured in this way, is similar in magnitude to
the value of working time for all individuals in the labor force. Further-
more, the growth of investment in education during the postwar period
exceeded the growth of market labor activities.
Second, we have measured the inputs of the education sector,
beginning with the purchased inputs recorded in the outlays of educa-
tional institutions, in Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992a). A major part of the
value of the output of educational institutions accrues to students in the
form of increases in their lifetime incomes. Treating these increases as
compensation for student time, we evaluated this time as an input into
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the value of student time, we allocated the growth of the education sector
to its sources.
An alternative approach, employed by Schultz (1961), Machlup
(1962), Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), and many others, is to apply Gold-
smith’s (1955-56) perpetual inventory method to private and public
expenditures on educational services. Unfortunately, this approach has
foundered on the absence of a satisfactory measure of the output of
the educational sector and the lack of an obvious rationale for capital
consumption. The approach fails to satisfy the conditions for integration
of income and wealth accounts established by Fisher (1906) and Samuel-
son (1961).2o
Given vintage accounts for human and nonhuman capital, Fraumeni
and I (1989) have constructed a system of income, product, and wealth
accounts, paralleling the system I had developed with Christensen. In
these accounts the value of human wealth was more than 10 times the
value of nonhuman wealth, while investment in human capital was five
times investment in tangible assets. We defined "full" investment in the
U.S. economy as the sum of these two types of investment. Similarly, we
added the value of nonmarket labor activities to personal consumption
expenditures to obtain "full" consumption. Our product measure in-
cluded these new measures of investment and consumption.
Since our complete accounting system included a production ac-
count with "full" measures of capital and labor inputs, we were able to
generate a new set of accounts for the sources of U.S. economic growth.
Our system also included an income and expenditure account with
income from labor services in both market and nonmarket activities. We
combined this with income from capital services and allocated "full"
income between consumption and saving.21 This provided the basis for a
new Measure of Economic Welfare and a set of accounts for the uses of
U.S. economic growth. Our system was completed by a wealth account
containing both human wealth and tangible assets.
We aggregated the growth of education and noneducation sectors of
the U.S. economy to obtain a new measure of U.S. economic growth.
Combining this with measures of input growth, we obtained a new set of
accounts for the sources of growth of the U.S. economy. Productivity
contributes almost nothing to the growth of the education sector and only
a modest proportion to output growth for the economy as a whole. We
also obtained a second approximation of the proportion of UoS. economic
growth that can be made endogenous. Within a Ramsey model with
separate education and noneducation sectors, we find that exogenous
productivity growth accounts for only 17 percent of growth.
20 For more detailed discussion, see Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989).
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The introduction of endogenous investment in education increases
the explanatory power of the Ramsey model of economic growth to 83
percent. However, it is important to emphasize that growth without
endogenous investment in education is measured differently. The tradi-
tional framework for economic measurement of Kuznets (1971) and
Solow (1970) excludes nonmarket activities, such as those that character-
ize the major portion of investment in education. The intuition is familiar
to any teacher, including teachers of economics: What the students do is
far more important than what the teachers do, even if the subject matter
is the theory of economic growth.
A third approximation to the proportion of growth that could be
attributed to investment within an extended Ramsey model results from
incorporation of all forms of investment in human capital. This would
include education, child rearing, and addition of new members to the
population. Fertility could be made endogenous by using the approach of
Robert Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Barro (1988). Child
rearing could be made endogenous by modeling the household as a
producing sector along the lines of the model of the educational sector I
have outlined above. The results presented by Jorgenson and Fraumeni
(1989) show that this would endogenize 86 percent of U.S. economic
growth. This is a significant, but not overwhelming, gain in explanatory
power for the Ramsey model.
In summary, endogenizing U.S. economic growth at the aggregate
level requires a distinction between investment and productivity as
sources of growth. There are two important obstacles to empirical
implementation of this distinction. First, the distinctive feature of invest-
ment as a source of growth is that the returns can be internalized.
Decisions can be successfully decentralized to the level of individual
investors in human capital and tangible assets. Productivity growth is
generated by spillovers that cannot be captured by private investors.
Activities generating these spillovers cannot be decentralized and require
collective decision-making through the public sector. Successive approx-
imations to the Ramsey model of economic growth increase the propor-
tion of growth that can be attributed to investment, rather than produc-
tivity.
ECONOMETRIC MODELING
We are prepared, at last, for the most difficult and least glamorous
part of the task of endogenizing economic growth--constructing quan-
titative models for the analysis of economic policies. The Ramsey growth
model of Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) requires the empirical
implementation of two highly problematical theoretical constructs,
namely, a model of producer behavior based on an aggregate production
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abstracts from important aspects of economic reality, but both have
important advantages in modeling long-term trends in economic growth.
My 1980 paper on "Accounting for Capital" presented a methodol-
ogy for aggregating over sectors. The existence of an aggregate produc-
tion function imposes very stringent conditions on production patterns at
the industry level. In addition to value-added functions for each sector,
an aggregate production function posits that these functions must be
identical. Furthermore, the ftmctions relating sectoral capital and labor
inputs to their components must be identical and each component must
receive the same price in all sectors.22
Although the assumptions required for the existence of an aggregate
production function appear to be highly restrictive, Fraumeni and I
estimated that errors of aggregation could account for less than 9 percent
of aggregate productivity growth.23 In 1987, Gollop, Fraumeni, and I
published updated data on sectoral and aggregate production accounts in
our book, Productivity and U.S. Economic Growth. We generated the data
for sectoral production accounts in a way that avoids the highly restric-
tive assumptions of the aggregate production function. These data were
then compared with those from the aggregate production account to test
for the existence of an aggregate production function. We demonstrated
that this hypothesis is inconsistent with empirical evidence. However,
our revised and updated estimate of errors arising from aggregation over
industrial sectors explained less than 3 percent of aggregate productivity
growth over the period of our study, 1948 to 1979.24
Gollop, Fraumeni, and I also presented statistical tests of the much
weaker hypothesis that a value-added function exists for each industrial
sector, but this hypothesis was also rejected.25 The conclusion of our
research on production at the sectoral level was that specifications of
technology;such as the aggregate production function and sectoral
valued-added functions result in substantial oversimplifications of the
empirical evidence. However, these specifications are useful for particu-
lar but limited purposes. For example, sectoral value-added functions are
indispensable for aggregating over sectors, while the aggregate produc-
tion function is a useful simplification for modeling aggregate long-run
growth, as originally proposed by Tinbergen (1942).
Sectoral value-added functions were employed by Hall (1988, 1990a)
22 A detailed survey of econometric modeling of production is included in my 1986
paper, "Econometric Modeling of Producer Behavior." This is also the focus of Solow’s 1967
survey article, "Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Production." The conceptual
basis for the existence of an aggregate production function was provided by Robert Hall
(1973).
23 Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980), Table 2.38, lines 4 and 11.
24 Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), Table 9.5, lines 6 and 11.
23 Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987), Table 7.2, pp. 239-41. The existence of an
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in modeling production at the sectoral level. In measuring capital and
labor inputs, he adhered to the traditional framework of Kuznets (1971)
and Solow (1970) by identifying labor input with hours worked and
capital input with capital stock. He found large, apparently increasing
returns to scale in the production of value added.26 Producer equilibrium
under increasing returns requires imperfect competition. However, Su-
santo Basu and John Fernald (1996) have pointed out that the value-
added data employed by Hall are constructed on the basis of assumptions
of constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
Basu and Fernald (1996) have employed the strategy for sectoral
modeling of production recommended in my book with Gollop and
Fraumeni (1987), treating capital, labor, and intermediate inputs symmet-
rically. They estimate returns to scale for the sectoral output and input
data presented in my 1990 paper to be constant. These data include
constant-quality measures of capital, labor, and intermediate input. Basu
and Fernald (1996) also show that returns to scale in the production of
value added are constant, when value added is defined in the same way
as in my book with Gollop and Fraumeni and constant-quality measures
of capital and labor inputs are employed.
Data for individual firms provide additional support for value-
added production functions with constant or even decreasing returns
to scale. Estimates incorporating intellectual capital have been surveyed
by Griliches (1994, 1995) and Bronwyn Hall (1996).27 These estimates are
now available for many different time periods and several countries.
Almost all existing studies employ value-added data for individual firms
and provide evidence for constant or decreasing returns to scale. This
evidence is further corroborated by an extensive study of plant-level data
by Martin Baily, Charles Hulten, and Donald Campbell (1992), providing
evidence of constant returns at the level of individual manufacturing
plants.
Turning to the task of endogenizing investment in tangible assets
and education, we first review the endogenous accumulation of tangible
assets. An important objective of the Christensen-Jorgenson (1973) ac-
counting system was to provide the data for econometric modeling of
aggregate producer and consumer behavior. In collaboration with Law-
rence Lau, Christensen and I introduced an econometric model of
producer behavior in 1973. We modeled joint production of consump-
tion and investment goods from inputs of capital and labor services,
utilizing data on these outputs and inputs from the aggregate production
account.
26 Hall (1990a) reports a median degree of returns to scale in value added for 2-digit
U.S. manufacturing industries of 2.2!
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In 1975 Christensen, Lau, and I constructed an econometric model of
a representative consumer behavior. We estimated this model on the
basis of data from the aggregate income and expenditure account of the
Christensen-Jorgenson (1973) accounting system. We tested and rejected
the implications of a model of a representative consumer. Subsequently,
Lau, Thomas Stoker, and I (1982) constructed a model of consumer
behavior based on exact aggregation over individual consumers that
specializes to the representative consumer model for a fixed distribution
of total expenditure over the population of consumers.28
Ytm and I (1986a, 1986b)) constructed an econometric model for post-
war U.S. economic growth with endogenous accumulation of tangible
assets. Our model of consumer behavior involved endogenous labor-
leisure choice, following Tinbergen’s (1942) neoclassical econometric
model of economic growth. Labor-leisure choice is exogenous in Solow’s
(1956) neoclassical model. In addition, we employed the Ramsey (1928)
representation of intertemporal preferences to model saving-consump-
tion behavior, following Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). In Solow’s
model the saving ratio is exogenous.
The econometric application of Ramsey’s model of optimal saving
was initiated by Hall (1978), removing the final remaining gap between
theoretical and empirical perspectives on economic growth.29 This oc-
curred only eight years after Solow’s (1970) classic exposition of the
neoclassical theory of growth! The key to Hall’s achievement in 1978 was
the introduction of an econometrically tractable concept of "rational
expectations," which he successfully combined with Ramsey’s theoretical
model. Building on Hall’s framework, Lars Hansen and Kenneth Single-
ton (1982, 1983) have tested and rejected the underlying model of a
representative consumer.
Yun and I (1990) have revised and updated our econometric model
of U.S. economic growth and analyzed the consequences of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. We also considered alternative proposals for funda-
mental tax reform, including proposals now under consideration by the
U.S. Congress, such as consumption-based and income-based value-
added taxes. We found that the 1986 Act resulted in a substantial increase
in social welfare. However, we also discovered that several of the
alternative proposals would have produced substantially higher gains.
The econometric model of U.S. economic growth I developed with
Yun (1990, 1991a) provides the starting point for the endogenous growth
model of the U.S. economy that I constructed with Ho (1995). While the
28 A survey of empirical approaches to aggregation is given by Stoker (1993).
29 Hall’s 1978 paper and his subsequent papers on this topic have been reprinted in his
1990 book, The Rational Consumer. Hall (1990b) and Angus Deaton (1992) have presented
surveys of the literature on econometric modeling of consumer behavior within the Ramsey
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model with Yun endogenized capital input, the endogenous growth
model also endogenizes investment in human capital. This model in-
cludes all of the elements of our Ramsey model of U.S. economic growth.
However, the new model also includes a highly schematic model of
production for the U.S. educational system.
Our production model includes a production possibility frontier for
the noneducation sector that is analogous to the frontier in my papers
with Yun (1990, 1991a). The model also includes a production function for
the education sector with investment in education as the output. The
inputs include capital and labor services as well as purchases of goods
and services from the noneducation sector. For both submodels, we allow
for exogenous growth of productivity; however, Jorgenson and Fraumeni
(1992a) show that this is negligible for the education sector.
Ho and I (1995) have evaluated alternative educational policies
through the equivalent variation in wealth associated with each policy.
As an alternative case we consider an educational policy that would raise
the participation rates and policies, keeping taxes and expenditures
constant. Presumably, this would result in a lower level of "quality." We
also consider an alternative case that would retain the base case participa-
tion rates, but raise "quality" by increasing expenditures on consumption
goods and capital and labor services in the education sector and the
corresponding taxes. Eric Hanushek (1994) has shown that the second of
these alternative policies, substantial improvement in educational quality
through increased expenditure, is closely comparable to the actual
educational policy pursued during the 1980s.
Ho and I (1995) have shown that increasing participation rates
without altering expenditure would produce substantial gains in social
welfare. In this sense the "quality" level of the existing educational
system is too high to be cost-effective. On the other hand, increasing
"quality" with no change in participation rates would result in a sizable
loss in social welfare. These results are consistent with the literature on
educational production functions surveyed by Hanushek (1986, 1989).3°
With endogenous accumulation of tangible ,capital, as in the model I
constructed with Yun (1986), almost three-quarters of growth is endog-
enous. By contrast, the model with endogenous investment in education
I constructed with Ho (1995) accounts for 83 percent of growth. By
endogenizing fertility behavior and child rearing it would be possible, at
least in principle, to add an incremental 3 percentage points to the
3o Note that the meaning of "production function" in this context is different from the
meaning of this term in our model of the education sector. In Hanushek’s terminology, the
output of the education sector is measured in terms of measures of educational perfor-
mance, such as graduation rates or test scores. Our terminology is closer to Hanushek’s
(1994) concept of "value-added" by the educational system. The out-put of the education
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explanatory power of the Ramsey model of economic growth. Modeling
population growth endogenously is clearly feasible. However, the con-
struction of an econometric model with this feature would require
considerable new data development and is best left as an opportunity for
future research.
In summary, the endogenous models of growth I constructed with
Yun (1986a, 1986b) and Ho (1995) require the econometric implementa-
tion of concepts of an aggregate production function and a representative
consumer. While each of these concepts has important limitations, both
are useful in modeling long-run economic trends. Furthermore, these
concepts lead naturally to a substantial increase in the level of sophisti-
cation in data generation, integrating investment and capital into a
complete system of national accounts.
CONCLUSION
The key innovation in economic measurement required for endog-
enizing growth is a wealth account that can be integrated with produc-
tion and income and expenditure accounts. This encompasses the system
of vintage accounts for tangible assets implemented in my work with
Christensen (1973) as well as the vintage accounts for human capital I
developed with Fraumeni (1989). These incorporate accumulation equa-
tions for tangible assets and human capital, together with asset-pricing
equations. Both are essential in constructing endogenous models of growth
to replace the exogenous models that emerged from the professional
consensus of the early 1970s.
The framework for economic measurement developed in my work
with Christensen (1973) and Fraumeni (1989) incorporates the principal
features of the United Nations (1993) System of National.Accounts. This
provides a production account for allocating the sources of economic
growth be[ween investment and growth in productivity. It also includes
an income and expenditure account for analyzing the uses of economic
growth through consumption and saving. Alternative policies are ranked
by means of equivalent variations in wealth for the representative
consumer.
In principle, investment in new technology could be made endoge-
nous by extending the accounting framework to incorporate investment
in R&D. The BEA (1994) has provided a satellite system of accounts for
research and development, based on Goldsmith’s (1955-56) perpetual
inventory method, applied to private and public expenditures. Unfortu-
nately, this is subject to the same limitations as the approach to human
capital of Schultz (1961) and Machlup (1962). The BEA satellite system
has foundered on the absence of a satisfactory measure of the output of
research and development and the lack of an appropriate rationale for
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The standard model for investment in new technology, formulated
by Griliches (1973), is based on a production function incorporating
inputs of services from intellectual capital accumulated through invest-
ment in research and development. Intellectual capital is treated as a
factor of production in precisely the same way as tangible assets in my
work with Christensen (1973). Bronwyn Hall (1993) has developed the
implications of this model for the pricing of the services of intellectual
capital input and the evaluation of intellectual capital assets.31
Griliches (1973) represented the process of research and develop-
ment by means of a production function that included the services of
previous research and development. This captures the notion of "stand-
ing on the shoulders of giants," originated by Jacob Schmookler (1966)
and elaborated by Riccardo Caballero and Adam Jaffe (1993) and Jones
and Williams (1996). Under constant returns to scale, this representation
also captures the "congestion externality" modeled by Jones and Wil-
liams and by Nancy Stokey (1995). Research and development, leading to
investment in intellectual capital, is conducted jointly with production of
marketable output, and this poses a formidable obstacle to measuring the
output of new intellectual capital.
The model of capital as a factor of production that I first proposed in
1963 has been applied to tangible assets and human capital. However,
successful implementation of this model for intellectual capital would
require a system of vintage accounts including not only accumulation
equations for stocks of accumulated research and development, but also
asset pricing equations. These equations are essential for separating the
revaluation of intellectual property due to price changes over time from
depreciation of tl~is property due to aging. This is required for measuring
the quantity of intellectual capital input and its marginal product.
Pricing of intellectual capital is the key issue remaining before
investment in new technology can be endogenized in quantitative models
for the analysis of alternative economic policies. Bronwyn Hall (1993) has
constructed prices for stocks of accumulated intellectual capital from
stock market valuations of the assets of individual firms. However, she
points out that the high degree of persistence in 6xpenditures on research
and development at the firm level has made it virtually impossible to
separate the effects of the aging of assets from changes in the value of
these assets over time. Her evaluation of intellectual capital is conditional
upon a pattern of relative efficiencies imposed on past investments in new
technology.
Nonetheless, Hall’s pioneering research on pricing of intellectual
assets has yielded interesting and valuable insights. For example, the
31 These implications of the model are also discussed by Charles Jones and John
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gross rate of return in the computer and electronics industry, including
depreciation and revaluation of these assets, greatly exceeds that in other
industries. This can be rationalized by the fact that revaluation in this
industry, as measured by Hall, is large and negative, mirroring the rapid
decline in the price of the industry’s output. This is evidence for the
empirical significance of the process of creative destruction described by
Joseph Schumpeter (1942) and modeled by Phillippe Aghion and Peter
Howitt (1992), Stokey (1995), and Jones and Williams (1996). Since
revaluation enters negatively into the gross rate of return, this rate of
return exceeds that for industries with positive revaluations.
Another important result that emerges from Bronwyn Hall’s (1996)
survey of gross rates of return to research and development is the
repeated finding that investment funded by the federal government has
a zero private return. Even private firms conducting this research under
government contract have been unable to internalize the returns. This has
the very important policy implication that public investments in new
technology can be justified only by comparisons of the costs and benefits
to the government. Measurement of these benefits requires careful case
studies like those of civilian space technology by Henry Herzfeld (1985)
and commercial aircraft by David Mowery (1985). Grandiose visions of
spillovers from public research and development have been exposed as a
fleeting mirage.
The final issue that must be resolved in order to complete the
endogenization of economic growth is modeling of spillovers. Griliches
(1995) has provided a detailed survey of alternative methodologies and
results, based on the model he originated in 1979. The essential idea is to
include aggregate input of intellectual capital, together with the inputs of
individual producers, as a determinant of output. Unfortunately, this
requires precisely the same separation of marginal product and capital
input for intellectual capital needed for the identification of returns that
can be internalized by the individual producer.
Caballero and Richard Lyons (1990, 1992) have attempted to circum-
vent the problem of measuring intellectual capital by including aggregate
output as a determinant of sectoral productivity. However, Basu and
Fernald (1995) have shown that the positive results of Caballero and
Lyons depend on the same value added data employed by Robert Hall
(1988, 1990a). Treating capital labor, and intermediate inputs symmetri-
cally, as in their research on economies of scale, Basu and Fernald show
that the evidence for spillovers evaporates. This leaves open the question
of the importance of spillovers from investment in new technology,
which must await satisfactory measures of the output of research and
development.
An elegant and impressive application of the Griliches (1979) frame-
work for modeling spillovers across international boundaries has been
presented by David Coe and Elhanan Helpman (1995). The key idea is to70 Dale W. Jorgenson
trace the impact of these spillovers through trade in intermediate goods.
For each country, the stock of accumulated research and development
of its trading partners is weighted by bilateral import shares. However,
Wolfgang Keller (1996) has shown that the evidence of spillovers is even
more impressive if the bilateral trade shares are assigned randomly,
rather than matched with the countries conducting the research and
development. Another vision of spillovers can be assigned to the length-
ening roll of unproven theoretical hypotheses.
In summary, a great deal has been accomplished, but much remains
to be done to complete the endogenization of economic growth. An
important feature of recent research, for example, in the seminal papers
of Paul Romer (1986, 1987, 1990), has been the linking of theoretical and
empirical investigations. This integration need no longer be left to the
remarkable coincidence of empirical and theoretical perspectives that led
Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1970) to the neoclassical framework. In the
absence of a clear and compelling link between the theoretical model and
the data generation process, the breakdown of this framework had left
economists without a guide to long-run economic policy for two decades.
Fortunately, a new empirical and theoretical consensus on economic
growth would require only a relatively modest reinterpretation of the
neoclassical framework established by Solow (1956, 1970, 1988), Cass
(1965), and Koopmans (1965). However, the traditional framework of
economic measurement established by Kuznets (1961, 1971) and imbed-
ded in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts will have to be
augmented considerably. The most important change is a reinterpretation
of the concepts of investment and capital to encompass Fisher’s (1906)
notion of "wealth in its more general sense."
In closing, I must emphasize that my goal has been to provide a new
starting point in the search for a consensus on economic growth, rather
than to arrive at final conclusions. The new framework I have outlined is
intended to be open-ended, permitting a variety of different approaches
to investment--in tangible assets, human capital, and new technology.
Ample, if carefully delimited, space is available within this framework for
endogenizing spillovers, for example, by usin~ the Lindahl-Samuelson
theory of public goods. New entrants to the field will continue to find a
plethora of opportunities for modeling economic growth.TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 71
~EFERENCES
Abramovitz, Moses. 1956. "Resource and Output Trends in the United States since 1870."
The American Economic Review, vol. 46, no. 2 (May), pp. 5-23.
--. 1986. "Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind." Journal of Economic
History, vol. 46, no. 2 (June), pp. 385-406.
Aghion, Phillippe and Peter Howitt. 1992. "A Model of Growth through Creative Destruc-
tion." Econometrica, vol. 60, no. 2 (March), pp. 323-51.
Baily, Martin N. and Robert J. Gordon. 1988. "Measurement Issues, the Productivity
Slowdown, and the Explosion of Computer Power." Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, no. 2, ppo 1-45.
Baily, Martin N., Charles R. Hulten, and Donald Campbell. 1992. "Productivity Dynamics
in Manufacturing Plants." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, vol. 1,
pp. 187-267.
Baily, Martin N. and Charles L. Schultze. 1990. "The Productivity of Capital in a Period of
Slower Growth." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, vol. 1, pp.
369-406.
Barro, Robert J. and Gary S. Becker. 1989. "Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth."
Econometrica, vol. 7, no. 2 (March), pp. 481-502.
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1994. Economic Growth. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Basu, Susanto and John G. Fernald. 1995. "Are Apparent Productive Spillovers a Figment of
Specification Error?" Journal of Monetary Ecor~omics, vol. 36, no. 1 (August), pp. 165-88.
--. 1996. "Returns to Scale in U.S. Production: Estimates and Implications." Interna-
tional Finance Discussion Papers, No. 546, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, March.
Baumol, William J. 1986. "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What
the Long-Run Data Show." The American Economic Review, vol. 76, no. 5 (December),
pp. 1072-85.
--. 1994. "Multivariate Growth Patterns: Contagion and Common Forces as Possible
Sources of Convergence." In William J. Baumol, Richard R. Nelson, and Edward N.
Wolff, eds., Convergence of Productivity, pp. 62-85. New York: Oxford University Press.
Becker, Gary S. 1965. "A Theory of the Allocation of Time. "Economic Journal, vol. 75, no. 296
(September), pp. 493-517.
--. 1967. "Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income: An Analytical
Approach." Woytinsky Lecture No. 1, Institute of Public Administration, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor.
--. 1993. Human Capital, 3rd ed., (1st ed., 1964; 2nd ed., 1975). Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Becker, Gary S. and Robert J. Barro. 1988. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of
Fertility." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 103, no. 1 (February), pp. 1-25.
Berndt, Ernst R. 1991. The Practice of Econometrics: Classic and Contemporary. Reading, PA:
Addison-Wesley.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Stanley Fischer. 1989. Lectures on Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
Caballero, Riccardo Jo and Adam B. Jaffe. 1993. "How High Are the Giants’ Shoulders?: An
Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of
Economic Growth." In O. J. Blanchard and S. Fischer, eds., NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 1993, pp. 15-74. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Caballero, Riccardo J. and Richard K. Lyons. 1990. "Internal and External Economies in
European Industries." European Economic Review, vol. 34, no. 4 (April), pp. 805-30.
--. 1992. "External Effects in U.S. Procyclical Productivity." Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 29, no. 2 (April), pp. 209-26.
Carson, Carol and Steven Landefeld. 1994. "Integrated Economic and Environmental
Satellite Accounts." Survey of Current Business, vol. 74, no. 4 (April), pp. 33-49.
Cass, David. 1965. "Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation."
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 32(3), no. 91 (July), pp. 233-40.
Christensen, Laurits R. and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1969. "The Measurement of U.S. Real Capital
Input, 1929-1967." Review of Income and Wealth, series 15, no. 4 (December), pp. 293-320.72 Dale W. Jorgenson
--. 1970. "U.S. Real Product and Real Factor Input, 1929-1967." Review of Income and
Wealth, series 16, no. 1 (March), pp. 19-50.
--. 1973. "Measuring Economic Performance in the Private Sector." In M. Moss, ed., The
Measurement of Economic and Social Performance, pp. 233-338.
Christensen, Laurits R., Dianne Cummings, and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1981. "Relative
Productivity Levels, 1947-1973." European Economic Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (May), pp.
61-94.
Christensen, Laurits R., Dale W. Jorgenson, and Lawrence J. Lau. 1973. "Transcendental
Logarithmic Production Frontiers." Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 55, no. 1
(February) pp. 28-45.
--. 1975. "Transcendental Logarithmic Utility Functions." The American Economic
Review, vol. 65, no. 3 (June), pp. 367-83.
Coe, David T., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. "International R&D Spillovers." European
Economic Review, vol. 39, no. 5 (May), pp. 859-87.
Cole, Rosanne, Y. C. Chen, Joan A. Barquin-Stolleman, Ellen Dulberger, Nurhan Helvacian,
and James H. Hodge. 1986. "Quality-Adjusted Price Indexes for Computer Processors
and Selected Peripheral Equipment." Survey of Current Business, vol. 66, no. 1 (January),
pp. 41-50.
Deaton, Angus. 1992. Understanding Consumption, pp. 76-135. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Denison, Edward F. 1967. Why Growth Rates D~/er. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
--. 1974. Accounting for United States Economic Growth. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
--. 1989. Estimates of Productivity Change by Industry. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
Domar, Evsey. 1946. "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment." Econometrica,
vol. 14, no. 2 (April), pp. 137-47.
Dougherty, Chrys and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1996. "International Comparisons of the Sources
of Economic Growth." The American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 2 (May), pp. 25-29.
Douglas, Paul H. 1948. "Are There Laws of Production?" The American Economic Review, vol.
38, no. 1 (March) pp. 1-41.
Dulberger, Ellen. 1989. "The Application of a Hedonic Model to a Quality-Adjusted Index
for Computer Processors." In D. W. Jorgenson and R. Landau, eds., Technology and
Capital Formation, pp. 37-76. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Englander, A. Steven and Andrew Gurney. 1994. "OECD Productivity Growth: Medium-
Term Trends." OECD Economic Studies, vol. 22 (Spring), pp. 111-30.
Englander, A. Steven, and Axel Mittelstadt. 1988. "Total Factor Productivity: Macroeco-
nomic and Structural Aspects of the Slowdown." OECD Economic Studies, voL 10
(Spring), pp. 7-56.
Fisher, Irving. 1906. The Nature of Capital and Income. New York: Macmillan.
Fraumeni, Barbara M. 1996. "The Measurement of Depreciation in the U.S. National Income
and Wealth Accounts." Survey of Current Business, forthcoming.
Fraumeni, Barbara M. and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1980. "The Role of Capital in Economic
Growth, 1948-1976." In G. M. von Furstenberg, ed., Capital, Efficiency, and Growth, pp.
9-250. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Gilbert, Milton, Wilfred Beckerman, John Edelman, Stephen Marris, Gerhard Stuvel, and
Manfred Teichert. 1958. Comparative National Products and Price Levels. Paris: OEEC.
Gilbert,. Milton and Irving B. Kravis. 1954. An International Comparison of National Products
and the Purchasing Power of Currencies. Paris: OEEC.
Goldsmith, Raymond. 1955-56. A Study of Saving in the United States, 3 Vols. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
--. 1962. The National Wealth of the United States in the Postwar Period. New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gordon, Robert J. 1990. The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Griliches, Zvi. 1960. "Measuring Inputs in Agriculture: A Critical Survey." Journal of Farm
Economics, vol. 40, no. 5 (December), pp. 1398-1427.TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 73
--. I973. "Research Expenditures and Growth Accounting." In B. R. Williams, ed.,
Science and Technology in Economic Growth, pp. 59-95. London: Macmillan.
--. 1979. "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to
Productivity Growth." Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 92-116.
--. 1992. "The Search for R&D Spillovers." Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 94,
Supplement, pp. 29-47.
--. 1994. "Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint." The American Economic Review,
vol. 84, no. 1 (March), pp. 1-23.
--. 1995. "R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and Measurement Issues." In P.
Stoneman, ed., Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, pp.
52-89. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
--. 1994. "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth." Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 23-44.
Hall, Bronwyn H. 1993. "Industrial Research during the 1980s: Did the Rate of Return Fall?"
Brookin,~s Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, no. 2, pp. 289-330.
--. 1996. "The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development." In B. L. R.
Smith and C. E. Barfield, eds., Technology, R&D, and the Economy, pp. 140-62.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and American Enterprise Institute.
Hall, Robert E. 1971. "The Measurement of Quality Change from Vintage Price Data." In Z.
Griliches, ed., Price Indexes and Quality Change, pp. 240-71. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
--. 1973. "The Specification of Technology with Several Kinds of Output." Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 81, no. 4 (July/August), pp. 878-92.
--. 1978. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis:
Theory and Evidence." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 86, no. 6 (December), pp.
971-87.
--. 1988. "The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry." Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 96, no. 5 (October), pp. 921-47.
--. 1990a. ’qnvariance Properties of Solow’s Productivity Residual." In P. Diamond,
ed., Growth/Productivity/Employment, pp. 71-112. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
--. 1990b. The Rational Consumer. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hall, Robert E. and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1967. "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior." The
American Economic Review, vol. 57, no. 3 (June), pp. 391-414.
--. 1969. "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Reply and Further Results." The
American Economic Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (June), pp. 388-401.
--. 1971. "Applications of the Theory of Optimal Capital Accumulation." In G. Fromm,
ed., Tax Incentives and Capital Spending, pp. 9-60. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hansen, Lars P. and Kenneth J. Singleton. 1982. "Generalized Instrumental Variables
Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models." Econometrica, vol. 50, no. 6
(November), pp. 1269-86.
--. 1983. "Stochastic Consumption, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Stock
Market Returns." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, no. 2 (April), pp. 249-65.
Hanushek, Eric A. 1986. "The Economics of Schooling." Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 24,
no. 4 (December), pp. 1141-78.
--. 1989. "The Impact of Differential Expenditures on School Performance." Educational
Researcher, vol. 18, no. 4 (May), pp. 45-51.
--. 1994. Making Schools Work. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Harrod, Roy. 1939. "An Essay in Dynamic Theory." Economic Journal, vol. 49, no. 194
(March), pp. 14-33.
Hertzfeld, Henry R. 1985. "Measuring the Ehonomic Impact of Federal Research and
Development Activities." Workshop on the Federal Role in Research and Development,
National Academies of Science and Engineering, November 21-22.
Hulten, Charles R. and Frank C. Wykoff. 1982. "The Measurement of Economic Deprecia-
tion." In C. R. Hulten, ed., Depreciation, Inflation and the Taxation of Income from Capital,
pp. 81-125.
Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts. 1993. System of National Accounts
1993, pp. 379-406. New York: United Nations.74 Dale !N. Jorgenson
Islam, Nasrul. 1995. "Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach." Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 110, no. 4 (November), pp. 1127-70.
Jones, Charles I. 1995a. "R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth." Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 103, no. 4 (August), pp. 759-84.
--. 1995b. "Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models." Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 110, issue 2 (May), pp. 495-526.
Jones, Charles I. and John C. Williams. 1996. "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics
of Investment in R&D." Department of Economics, Stanford University, February 26.
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1963. "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior." The American Economic
Review, vol. 53, no. 2 (May), pp. 247-59.
--. 1966. "The Embodiment Hypothesis." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 74, no. 1
(February), pp. 1-17.
--. 1967. "The Theory of Investment Behavior." In Ferber, R., ed., Determinants of
Investment Behavior, pp. 129-55. New York: Columbia University Press.
--. 1973. "The Economic Theory of Replacement and Depreciation." In W. Sellekaerts,
ed., Econometrics and Economic Theory, pp. 189-221, New York: Macmillan.
--. 1980. "Accounting for Capital." In G.M. yon Furstenberg, ed., Capital, Efficiency, and
Growth, pp. 251-319, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
--. 1986. "Econometric Modeling of Producer Behavior." In Z. Griliches and M. D.
Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 3, pp. 1841-1915. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
--. 1990. "Productivity and Economic Growth." In E. R. Berndt and J. Triplett, eds.,
F~y Years of Economic Measurement, pp. 19-118. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
--. 1996 "Empirical Studies of Depreciation." Economic Inquiry, vol. 34, no. 1 (January),
pp. 24-42.
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Barbara M. Fraumeni. 1989. "The Accumulation of Human and
Nonhuman Capital, 1948-1984." In R. E. Lipsey and H. S. Tice, eds., The Measurement
of Saving, Investment, and Wealth, pp, 227-82. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
--. 1992a. "Investment in Education and U.S. Economic Growth." Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, vol. 94, Supplement, pp. 51-70.
--. 1992b. "The Output of the Education Sector." In Z. Griliches, ed., Output Measure-
ment in the Services Sector, pp. 303-38. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Jorgenson, Dale W., Frank M. Gollop, and Barbara M. Fraumeni. 1987. Productivity and U.S.
Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Zvi Griliches. 1967. "The Explanation of Productivity Change."
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 34, no. 99 (July), pp. 249-80.
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Mun S. Ho. 1995. "Modeling Economic Growth." Harvard
University, Department of Economics.
Jorgenson, Dale W., Mun S. Ho, and Barbara M. Fraumeni 1994. "The Quality of the U.S.
Work Force, 1948-90." Harvard University, Department of Economics.
Jorgenson, Dale W., Lawrence J. Lau, and Thomas M. Stoker. 1982. "The Transcendental
Logarithmic Model of Aggregate Consumer Behavior." In R. L. Basmann and G.
Rhodes, eds., Advances in Econometrics, vol. 1, pp. 97-238. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Kevin Stiroh. 1995. "Computers and Growth." Economics of
Innovation and New Technology, vol. 3 (December), pp. 295-316.
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Kun-Young Yun. 1986a. "The Efficiency of Capital Allocation."
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 85-107.
--. 1986b. "Tax Policy and Capital Allocation." Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.
88, no. 2, pp. 355-77.
--. 1990. "Tax Reform and U.S. Economic Growth." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98,
no. 5, part 2 (October), pp. 151-93.
--. 1991a. "The Excess Burden of U.S. Taxation." Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance, vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall), pp. 487-509.
--. 1991b. Tax Reform and the Cost of Capital, pp. 1-38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keller, Wolfgang. 1996. "Are International R&D Spillovers Trade-Related? An Analysis
Using Monte-Carlo Techniques." Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, March 16.TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 75
Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1965. "On the Concept of Optimum Growth." In The Econometric
Approach to Development Planning, pp. 225-300. Chicago, IL: Rand-McNally.
Kravis, Irving B., Alan Heston, and Robert Summers. 1978. International Comparisons of Real
Product and Purchasing Power. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kuznets, Simon. 1961. Capital in the American Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
--. 1971. Economic Growth of Nations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
--. 1992. "Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections." In A. Lindbeck, ed.,
Nobel Lectures: Economic Sciences, 1969-1980, pp. 87-102.
Lau, Lawrence J. 1996. "The Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth: Observations from
the Experience of Developed and Developing Countries." In R. Landau, T. Taylor, and
G. Wright, eds., The Mosaic of Economic Growth, pp. 63-91. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Levine, Ross and David Renelt. 1992. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth
Regressions." The American Economic Review, vol. 82, no. 4 (September), pp. 942-63.
Lindbeck, Assar. 1992. ed., Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences, 1969-1980. River Edge, NJ:
World Scientific Publishing Company.
Lucas, Robert E. 1988. "On The Mechanics of Economic Development." Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 22, no. 1 (July) pp. 2-42.
Machlup, Fritz. 1962. The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Maddison, Angus. 1982. Phases of Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
--. 1991. Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
--. 1995. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992. Paris: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development.
Maler, Karl-Goran. 1992. Nobel Lectures in Economic Sciences, 1981-1990. River Edge, NJ:
World Scientific Publishing Company.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David Weil. 1992. "A Contribution to the Empirics
of Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, no. 2 (May), pp. 407-37.
Mincer, Jacob. 1974. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Mowery, David C. 1985. "Federal Funding of R&D in Transportation: The Case of
Aviation." Workshop on the Federal Role in Research and Development, National
Academies of Science and Engineering, November 21-22.
Nordhaus, William D. and James Tobin. 1972. Is Growth Obsolete? New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research; reprinted in M. Moss, ed., The Measurement of Economic
and Social Performance, 1973, pp. 509-32. New York: Columbia University Press.
Pieper, Paul E. 1989. "Construction Price Statistics Revisited." In D. W. Jorgenson and R.
Landau, eds., Technology and Capital Formation, pp. 293-330. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
--. 1990. "The Measurement of Construction Prices: Retrospect and Prospect." In E. R.
Berndt and J. Triplett, eds., F~fly Years of Economic Measurement, pp. 239-68. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Ramsey, Frank. 1928. "A Mathematical Theory of Saving." Economic Journal, vol. 28, no. 112
(December), pp. 543-59.
Rebelo, Sergio. 1991. "Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth." Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 99, no. 3 (June), pp. 500-521.
Romer, Paul. 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth." Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 94, no. 5 (October), pp. 1002-37.
--. 1987. "Crazy Explanations for the Productivity Slowdown." In Stanley Fischer, ed.,
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 163-201. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
--. 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change." Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, no.
5, part 2 (October), pp. $71-$102.
--. 1994. "The Origins of Endogenous Growth." Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8,
no. 1 (Winter), pp. 3-20.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1961. "The Evaluation of ’Social Income’: Capital Formation and
Wealth." In F. A. Lutz and D. C. Hague, eds., The Theory of Capital, pp. 32-57. London:
Macmillan.76 Dale W. Jorgenson
Schmookler, Jacob. 1966. Invention and Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Schumpeter0 Joseph. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.
Schultz, Theodore W. 1961. "Investment in Human Capital." The American Economic Review,
vol. 51, no. 1 (March), pp. 1-17.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 70, no. 1 (February), pp. 65-94.
--. 1957. "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function." The Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 39, no. 3 (August), pp. 312-20.
--. 1960. "Investment and Technical Progress." In K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes,
eds., Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959, pp. 89-104. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
--. 1970. Growth Theory: An Exposition. New York: Oxford University Press.
--. 1967. "Some Recent Developments in the Theory of Production." In Brown, M., ed.,
The Theory and Empirical Analysis of Production, pp. 25-50. New York: Columbia
University Press.
--. 1988. "Growth Theory and After." The American Economic Review, vol. 78, no. 3
(June), pp. 307-17.
--. 1992. Growth Theory, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
--. 1994. "Perspectives on Growth Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, no.
1 (Winter), pp. 45-54.
Stoker, Thomas M. 1993. "Empirical Approaches to the Problem of Aggregation over
Individuals." Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 31, no. 4 (December), pp. 1827-74.
Stokey, Nancy L. 1995. "R&D and Economic Growth." Review of Economic Studies, vol. 62, no.
3 (July), pp. 469-89.
Stone, Richard. 1984. "The Accounts of Society." In K.-G. Maler, ed., 1992, Nobel Lectures in
Economic Sciences, 1981-1990, pp. 115-39.
Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston. 1984. "Improved International Comparisons of Real
Product and Its Composition: 1950-1980." Review of Income and Wealth, series 30, no. 2
(June), pp. 207-62.
--. 1988. "A New Set of International Comparisons of Real Product and Price Levels:
Estimates for 130 Countries, 1950-1985." Review of Income and Wealth, series 34, no. 1
(March), pp. 1-25.
--. 1991. "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International
Comparisons, 1950-1988." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, issue 2 (May), pp.
327-68.
Summers, Robert, Irving B. Kravis, and Alan Heston. 1980. "International Comparisons of
Real Product and Its Composition, 1950-77." Review of Income and Wealth, series 26, no.
1 (March), pp. 19-66.
Tinbergen, Jan. 1942. "On the Theory of Trend Movements." In Jan Tinbergen, Selected
Papers, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1959, pp. 182-221 (translated from "Zur Theorie
der Langfristigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Band 55, Nu. 1,
1942, pp. 511-49).
Triplett, Jack. 1986. "The Economic Interpretation of Hedonic Methods." Survey of Current
Business, vol. 66, no. 1 (January), pp. 36-40.
--. 1989. "Price and Technological Change in a Capital Good: Survey of Research on
Computers." In D. W. Jorgenson and R. Landau, eds., Technology and Capital Formation,
pp. 127-213. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
--. 1990. "Hedonic Methods in Statistical Agency Environments: An Intellectual
Biopsy." In E. R. Berndt and J. Triplett, eds., F~ty Years of Economic Measurement, pp.
207-38.
--. 1996. "Measuring the Capital Stock: A Review of Concepts and Data Needs."
Economic Inquiry, vol. 34, no. 1 (January), pp. 93-115.
United Nations. 1968. A System of National Accounts. New York: United Nations.
--. 1993. System of National Accounts 1993. New York: United Nations.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1982. Measuring Nonmarket Economic Activity: BEA
Working Papers, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Working Paper 2. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Commerce, December.TECHNOLOGY IN GROWTH THEORY 77
--. 1986. "Improved Deflation of Purchases of Computers." Survey of Current Business,
vol. 66, no. 3 (March), pp. 7-9.
--. 1994. "A Satellite Account for Research and Development." Survey of Current
Business, vol 74. no. 11 (November), pp. 37-71.
--. 1995. "Preview of the Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product
Accounts: Recognition of Government Investment and Incorporation of a New Meth-
odology for Calculating Depreciation." Survey of Current Business, vol. 75, no. 9
(September), pp. 33-41.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1983. Trends in Multifactor Productivity, Bulletin 2178.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor.
--. 1993. Labor Composition and U.S. Productivity Growth, 1948-90, Bulletin 2426.
Washington, DC: U.S. Depart~nent of Labor.
--. 1994. "Multifactor Productivity Measures, 1991 and 1992." News Rdease USDL
94-327, July 11.
U.S. Office of Business Economics. 1966. The National Income and Product Accounts of the
United States, 1929-1965, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business. Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
World Bank. 1994. World Development Report 1993. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Young, Allan. 1989. "BEA’s Measurement of Computer Output." Survey of Current Business,
voL 69, no. 7 (July), pp. 108-15.DISCUSSION
Susanto Basu*
Dale Jorgenson has written a provocative and challenging paper
based on many years of research on theory and measurement. He takes
a position that challenges important elements of both the neoclassical
growth theory of the 1960s and 1970s and the "New Growth" theory of
the 1980s. He adopts the standard neoclassical framework of an aggre-
gate production function with constant returns to scale, perfect competi-
tion, and no externalities or spillovers between firms. On the other hand,
he agrees with the basic tenet of New Growth theory that long-run
growth rates should be "endogenous’--explained by economic forces--
instead of being taken as exogenous to the economic system. In this
paper, Jorgenson argues that a slightly augmented version of Robert
Solow’s (1957) growth-accounting framework is sufficient to explain all
of postwar economic growth as the outcome of purposeful investment.1
In particular, one need not invoke "exogenous technological progress."
To understand the ambition of this project, note that Solow found
that capital accumulation explained only 12.5 percent of per capita out-
put growth, with the remainder attributed to exogenous changes in
technology!
In order to assess the success of Jorgenson’s project, I want to ask
how well his framework does at explaining three fundamental questions
of growth theory.
Why does per capita income increase over time?
*Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Michigan.
1 In Jorgenson’s lexicon, "investment" means that all returns are appropriated by the
investor, in a model that has perfect competition. Understanding this terminology is
important, since the New Growth theory also explains all growth as the outcome of capital
accumulation, but must invoke either increasing returns or spillovers to do so.DISCUSSION 79
. Why are some countries rich and others poor?
¯ Why has economic growth slowed down in developed countries?
The framework that Jorgenson uses leaves him very few degrees of
freedom--a virtue in any scientific hypothesis. Thus, his answers to
all three questions must be, "Variations in the quality and quantity of
investment in a standard neoclassical setting." The setting is that of a
standard constant-returns production function for every producer (and
therefore for the economy):
Y = AF(K, L, T), (1)
where K is capital, L is labor, and T stands for technology. As noted,
we assume constant returns to scale, perfect competition, and no spill-
overs. This is the standard setting of growth accounting and productivity
measurement using the Solow (1957) residual:
Ap = Ay - aLAI -- (1 -- aL)Ak. (2)
Lowercase letters represent natural logarithms and aL is the share of labor
income in national income. Under Jorgenson’s conditions, Ap is propor-
tional to At. To simplify matters, assume that a fixed fraction of national
output is devoted to capital accumulation:
AK = s~<Y - 8~<K. (3)
So far, everything is standard neoclassical theory. Unlike Solow,
however, Jorgenson does not allow for exogenous change in technology.
In his framework, "technology" is just knowledge (a shorthand for R&D
and other forms of human capital), and knowledge is a form of capital
that is accumulated like any other. On the other hand, the New Growth
theory, which also treats knowledge as a form of capital, believes that
knowledge is special, in the sense that investors cannot fully internalize
the benefits from accumulating knowledge. The New Growth theory thus
has large spillovers to knowledge accumulation. These two positions can
be summed up as special cases of the following general equation:
AT = (sTY)T￿  - 3fT. (4)
qb indexes the size of knowledge spillovers--the degree to which previous
knowledge reduces the cost of accumulating new knowledge. Jorgenson
holds that ~b = 0; note that in this case equation (4) is an exact analog of
equation (3), so there is nothing special about knowledge capital. On the
other hand, New Growth theory requires very strong spillovers: At a
minimum, it needs ~b = 1.
Both of these extreme positions have some unpleasant implications.
Jorgenson’s position implies that, in the long run, no per capita output80 Susanto Basu
growth can occur (since his model has capital accumulation as the only
source of growth, but the marginal product of capital is diminishing).
This seems to contradict both recent human experience (since the
Industrial Revolution) and very long-run experience (the rise in living
standards since Neolithic times). On the other hand, the parameters of
the New Growth theory imply that the long-run growth rate of per capita
output depends on the rate of saving in knowledge. Jones (1995) shows
that postwar time series data for the United States and other advanced
economies reject this implication.
However, as Jones (1995) points out, a whole range of intermediate
positions is possible: We can have 0 ~ ~b < 1. An intermediate position
of this sort is consistent with many studies that find significant positive
spillovers to R&D investment, and with our intuition that something is
indeed special about knowledge. It also avoids both the counterfactual
implications noted above. The intermediate model predicts that long-
run per capita growth will occur, but says that this growth rate is not
influenced by policy.
But while I believe that the data do not fully support Jorgenson’s
answer to the first question, I think his answer is closer to being correct
than either the neoclassical model or the New Growth model. In
particular, his conclusion--that growth is driven by investment but
growth rates are not--is robust to adding spillovers of moderate size.
It is in answering the second question, however, that Jorgenson’s
framework shows greater problems. The recent work of Islam (1995)
shows that production functions seem to differ significantly across
countries: That is, differences in capital per worker seem insufficient to
explain cross-country differences in output per worker. Thus, we need a
modification of equation (1):
Yi =AiF(K, L, T), (5)
where i indexes "location." What are the economics of "location"? In the
context of cross-country growth, it is easy to identify "location" with
geography. But in the sense that matters for economics, location means
a factor that is relevant for production. Such factors can certainly be
country-specific--for example, political and legal institutions--but they
probably also have a great deal to do with technology diffusion and
infrastructure, factors that can vary even within countries (and some-
times be approximately constant across countries).
These cross-country results suggest that we augment the Jorgenson
"Quality, Quantity" paradigm with one other factor: "Quality, Quantity,
Location." I conclude by asking whether location in the sense I have
defined it might matter for short-run productivity dynamics within
countries--for example, the productivity slowdown that has been the
focus of much public discussion.DISCUSSION 81
Figure 1
A Comparison of Productivity Growth
and Technological Change
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Location matters if identical factors of production have different
marginal products in different uses. In the context of within-country
differences, location might matter if different sectors (firms, industries)
have different degrees of market power or different returns to scale, or
pay identical workers different wages. Basu and Fernald (1995) discuss
these ideas in detail. Their conclusion can be summarized as saying that
a gap exists between productivity change and technology change, and
this gap comes from factor reallocation:
Ap = At + R. (6)
Recall that Ap is productivity growth and At is technology change. R
stands for "reallocation." One implication of equation (6) is that changes
in the growth rate of productivity may not represent changes in the
growth rate of technology, as most of the discussion surrounding the
productivity slowdown assumes. Instead, a change in the growth rate of
productivity may represent a change in the allocation of inputs over time.
This is an important conjecture to examine, since the policy responses to
the two would likely be quite different.82 Susanto Basu
Using the methods of Basu and Fernald (1995), I construct the R in
equation (6). To allow for a trend break in R around the time of the
productivity slowdown, I estimate R separately over two subsamples:
1949 to 1969, and 1970 to 1989. Subtracting the implied series for R from
the series for productivity growth defined in equation (2) yields the
implied series for technology change. Figure I presents the results. As the
figure shows, the calculations imply that changes in input allocation
accounted for the bulk of the productivity slowdown, with only a small
reduction in the growth rate of technology. This calculation is subject to
all of the caveats noted by Basu and Fernald (1995), but it is at least
suggestive.
To summarize, Dale Jorgenson has written a paper that shows the
explanatory power of standard neoclassical theory when combined
with careful measurement. For the reasons I have outlined, I think that
model will need to be augmented by allowing for small knowledge
spillovers and a modest degree of imperfect competition. Nevertheless,
the amended model will retain much of the flavor of the neoclassical
framework, particularly in the conclusion that economic policy does not
determine the rate of long-term growth. However, policy may have an
important effect on the level of output (and hence welfare), and thus is
likely to be far from irrelevant.
REFERENCES
Basu, Susanto and John G. Fernald. 1995. "Aggregate Productivity and the Productivity of
Aggregates." International Finance Discussion Paper No. 532, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, December.
Islam, Nazrul. 1995. "Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach." Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 110, no. 4 (November), pp. 1127-70.
Jones, Charles I. 1995. "R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth." Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 103, no. 4 (August), pp. 759-84.
Solow, Robert M. 1957. "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function." The
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 39, no. 3 (August), pp. 312-20.Gene M. Grossman*
Despite the title of his paper, Dale Jorgenson devotes relatively few
words to elucidating the place of technology in growth theory. Many of
what I consider to be the most important questions about technology and
growth are not addressed. Therefore, I will devote most of my space to
explaining how I would have interpreted the topic "technology in growth
theory," while addressing a few comments to the particulars of his paper,
in passing.
It seems to me that one could ask four levels of questions about the
place and treatment of technology in growth theory. First:
o Is technological progress needed to sustain growth? That is, can
and would growth continue indefinitely if more and more of the
tangible factors could be accumulated but there were no improve-
ments in the ability to combine these factors in producing final
output?
As we now know, and in fact as Bob Solow knew already in 1956,
growth can be sustained with an unchanging technology provided there
are no long-run diminishing returns to the accumulable factors of
production. That is, if as physical and human capital are accumulated
indefinitely, their rates of return remain bounded above some minimum
level, then growth can and will continue without any technological
progress.
While we cannot know for sure whether or not this condition applies,
both a priori reasoning and the available econometric evidence suggest
*Jacob Viner Professor of International Economics, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton University.84 Gene M. Grossman
that it does not. On a priori grounds, it is easy to think of factors that are
available in relatively fixed supply that should impart decreasing returns
to those that can be accumulated. I am thinking in particular of natural
endowments--land, water, minerals, fuels, and the like--but "raw" labor
~might become another constraining factor at some point. The econometric
evidence presented by, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
points to rather significant diminishing returns to physical and human
capital, even if both types of capital accumulate together.
A simple thought experiment might make the issue more concrete.
Imagine how the world economy would have evolved if none of the
major inventions of the last 200 years had materialized--no steam engine,
no electricity, no transistors, no computers, and so on. Would growth
have proceeded nonetheless thanks to investments in ever more capital
(more field animals and hand instruments?) and continued increases in
levels of schooling?
Parenthetically, I would remark that growth accounting, no matter
how carefully conducted, cannot shed light on this question. The reason
is that growth accounting is just that--an accounting procedure, but not
a structural model. It is easiest to see the point at the sectoral level, using
the approach favored by Jorgenson and his coauthors, which includes
intermediate goods as well as capital and labor as factors used in
producing gross output. Suppose we observe that output of the automo-
bile industry has doubled, that inputs of steel have doubled, and that
steel accounts for 50 percent of the value of a car. Growth accountants
would claim that they have "explained" half of the growth of output
already; I would claim that they have explained nothing. Knowing that
steel inputs have increased does not tell us why output has expanded, or
whether it would have expanded under some alternative counterfactual
scenario. Rather, steel inputs increased because firms wanted to produce
more cars, for some other reason.
Similarly, observing that physical and human capital inputs have
expanded does not tell us why growth has occurred, or whether it would
have occurred absent technological progress. Individuals invest in these
assets in the expectation of making a return, and until we explain the
determinants and evolution of that return we have not explained the
associated growth. In other words, the statement that investment is more
important in the growth process than productivity increases is a mean-
ingless one, unless one believes that investments happen autonomously.
The second question I would ask about the role of technology in
growth theory is as follows:
¯ Is technological progress the result of intentional (economic)
activities or not? That is, is it endogenous to the economic system
or exogenously determined?DISCUSSION 85
Here again the verdict is still out, but my own view is that a lot of
technological progress is endogenous. For one thing, firms in the United
States now spend more than 100 billion dollars per year in activities
labeled as formal R&D. Presumably, they are being driven to do so by a
profit motive, and they believe they are getting something for their
money. The more convincing evidence, to me, comes from looking across
time and across space. Baumol (1990) provides a compelling account of
how the allocation of entrepreneurial effort to innovation has varied
across historical epochs and how this variation seems to align closely
with the types of incentives confronting these entrepreneurs. And the
great variation in productivity levels across regions and countries also
seems to relate to the nature of the various economic environments and
the rules of the game.
Let me remark briefly on an often-heard comment, which is also
implicit in many of the growth accounting exercises: that R&D is too
small a percentage of GDP to be an important determinant of technolog-
ical progress and growth. It is true that an allocation of 2 to 3 percent of
output per year, even with high rates of return, can directly account for
only a small fraction of aggregate output growth. But again, the account-
ing perspective is not the correct one. In our 1994 Journal of Economic
Perspectives article, Elhanan Helpman and I report a simple back-of-the-
envelope calculation to show that a small amount of R&D might drive a
good deal of growth, once the investments in capital that are undertaken
to implement the new innovations are taken into account.
Jorgenson confuses the issue, I feel, when he equates identifying the
"sources of growth" with "endogenizing" growth. He believes that it
is important to allocate the sources of growth between investment and
productivity, and that the part of output expansion that can be accounted
for by investment has been endogenized, whereas productivity growth
(the residual) remains exogenous. I would rather reserve the words
"endogenous growth" for growth that can be traced to its fundamental
economic determinants. An accounting procedure that attributes output
growth to investment has not endogenized growth, unless the factors that
generate incentives for investment are also explained. On the other hand,
growth that can be traced to productivity increases might be endogenous,
if the productivity increases themselves can be tied convincingly to
economic activities.
The third question I would ask is this:
o Is formal R&D responsible for most technological progress?
Here I would guess the answer is "probably not." One negative
observation is that made by Charles Jones (1995): Formal R&D, as
measured by either the number of scientists and engineers engaged in
R&D or business spending on R&D, has been growing steadily and
rapidly in the postwar period, while rates of total factor productivity86 Gene M, Grossman
growth and per capita output grow~th have not (on a related point, see
Hall 1993). Also, declining R&D does not seem to explain the productivity
slowdown that occurred after 1973 (Griliches 1988). Undoubtedly, many
activities contribute to firms’ productivities besides their formal R&D.
Mansfield (1988) notes that Japanese firms have devoted as much as
40 percent of the cost of developing new products to activities that would
be categorized as "process engineering"; for example, to tooling and
manufacturing equipment and facilities. Even more informal activities--
what the theory literature might designate as "learning by doing"--have
been found to be empirically important in many industries. And im-
provements in the organization of firms and production also contribute
significantly to productivity gains.
The theoretical literature on endogenous innovation so far has
concentrated on formal R&D. I would guess that this has more to do
with what theorists feel they know how to model than it does with any
empirical assessment of what is more or less important. I could easily
imagine growth theory evolving to a richer specification of the various
activities firms undertake to improve their productivity.
The fourth and final question on my list, and the one that seems to
interest Jorgenson the most, concerns the normative implications of our
models of growth. In particular:
¯ Is the level of investment in new technologies determined by
market forces the socially optimal one? Would welfare or growth
rates rise dramatically if we promoted more R&D? And is the R&D
tax credit, or another similar subsidy scheme, the appropriate way
to do so?
As is well known, the normative questions hinge on the existence or
not of positive spillovers in the process of creating knowledge. Griliches
(1992) distinguishes two types of spillovers. Rent spillovers arise if
innovating firms cannot act as perfectly discriminating monopolists and
thereby capture all of the consumer-surplus benefits from their new and
better products in the form of increased prices. Knowledge spillovers
occur if learning activities undertaken by one set of agents make research
more productive for others, and if the latter group does not need to
compensate the former for these benefits.
Jorgenson clearly is suspicious of such spillovers. He explains how
investments in R&D create "intellectual assets" which yield private
returns in the form of profits and royalties. And he notes that an "increase
in intellectual capital contributes to output growth in proportion to
its marginal product in the same way as the acquisition of a tangible
asset." Both of these points are of course correct. But intellectual capital
is different from physical capital, certainly in degree if not in kind.
Whereas the property rights to physical capital can easily be defined and
enforced, the property rights for intellectual capital are notoriouslyDISCUSSION 87
difficult to protect. And whereas physical capital is a "rival input" in the
sense that it can only be used in one place at one time, intellectual capital
is "nonrival" inasmuch as the same knowledge can be deployed in many
places simultaneously. Therefore, while investments in intellectual capi-
tal can and do generate private returns, the scope for social returns in
excess of private returns far exceeds that for other types of investment.
A myriad of studies have attempted to measure spillovers by
examining different firms, industries, and countries, using a variety of
case-study and econometric techniques. These studies have been sur-
veyed many times, for example, by Griliches (1992) and Mairesse and
Mohnen (1995). The specific findings vary widely, and the many meth-
odological problems would shake one’s confidence in any single one of
them. Nonetheless, most of the studies find private rates of return in
excess of 20 percent and social rates of return more than twice as high as
the private rates. Moreover, the estimated rates of return are invariably
higher than those found in the same studies for physical capital. All of
this leads Griliches to conclude:
In spite of all these difficulties, there has been a significant number of
reasonably well done studies all pointing in the same direction: R&D spillovers
are present, their magnitude may be quite large, and social rates of return
remain significantly above private rates (1992, p. $43).
Even so, one cannot immediately conclude that there is too little
innovation. As Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991) have shown, the existence of positive knowledge spillovers from
R&D is not sufficient for the conclusion that it would be socially beneficial
to allocate greater resources to this activity; in markets with imperfect
competition, firms might invest too much in R&D if their private benefits
came largely from taking business from their rivals rather than from
expanding the size of the social pie. But calibration exercises performed
by Stokey (1995) and Jones and Williams (1996) suggest that this caveat
probably has more bite in theory than it does in practice.
The question of whether an R&D tax credit or another subsidy is a
good way to encourage industrial innovation is a different one entirely.
Many observers (for example, Mansfield 1986) believe that an R&D tax
credit does as much or more to encourage firms to redefine their activities
as R&D as it does to promote greater innovation effort. And even if the
government could somehow monitor R&D expenses closely, it is not at all
clear that the social return to this sort of learning activity exceeds that for
the other things that firms do in their efforts to enhance their productivity.
Jorgenson seems to believe that growth accounting can shed light
on the appropriateness of R&D promotion and other similar policy
problems. In particular, he associates "spillo~ers" with the size of the
Solow residual. I fail to see this correspondence. There might be a sizable88 Gene M. Grossman
residual in aggregate growth accounting due to, for example, an impor-
tant component of exogenous technological progress, and yet no spill-
overs from research activities and no call for (economic) policy inter-
vention in the growth process. Alternatively, the residual might be
reasonably small, and yet spillovers large and government intervention
very much warranted. The latter could occur if the well-known problems
of measuring product quality meant that actual output growth were
greater than what is measured, or if a relatively small amount of total
factor productivity growth were sufficient to induce a great deal of
investment in physical and human capital.
CONCLUSION
Let me summarize my own feelings about the role of technology in
growth theory as follows. First, there is no reason at. all to deny or
diminish the accomplishments of neoclassical growth theory. Undoubt-
edly, understanding the incentives for investment are important for
understanding growth. But so too, I would argue, is understanding the
incentives for innovation, the more so the longer the growth horizon. The
neoclassical model, with its built-in assumptions of constant returns to
scale and perfect competition, is not well suited for studying innovation.
Investments in knowledge are up-front investments that naturally imply
increasing returns to scale in production. Firms cover these fixed costs by
charging prices in excess of marginal cost. Therefore, there is little choice
but to study ilxnovation in a setting that allows for imperfect competition,
despite the ambiguities in policy advice that this implies. Growth theory
has made some modest progress along these lines in recent years, but
much more remains to be done.
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